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IRAN AND IRAQ AND THE OBLIGATIONS TO
RELEASE AND REPATRIATE PRISONERS OF WAR
AFTER THE CLOSE OF HOSTILITIES
John Quigley*
In the past several years, the United Nations has assumed a more
prominent role in resolving international and civil military conflicts.
Recently, it played a significant part in arranging the current cease-fire
in the eight-year war (1980-88) between Iran and Iraq. The United
Nations is now encouraging Iran and Iraq to negotiate a permanent
peace agreement, and to release and repatriate their prisoners of war
(POWs).
Iran and Iraq still hold over 100,000 prisoners captured during the
war.' Many of the prisoners have remained captive since early in the
war. To date, each side has released only small numbers of sick and
wounded prisoners.2 The continued confinement of the majority of the
prisoners raises important issues of humanitarian law and of human
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University.
1. Lewis, Red Cross Seeks to Interview All P.O.W.'s in the Gulf War, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 8, 1988, at A8 [hereinafter Lewis, Red Cross Seeks].
2. H.E. Wissam Zahawie, Prisoners of War in the Iran-Iraq Conflict: Facts and
Assessment 7-10 (May 29-30, 1989) (a presentation at the International Meeting of
Experts of the International Progress Organization, Geneva, Switzerland) (available at
the Washington College of Law Library, The American University); see also H. Kle-
catsky, Preliminary Report on the Exchange of Prisoners of War Between Iran and
Iraq as a Requirement of International Law and Human Rights 2 (May 29-30, 1989)
(a report submitted to the International Meeting of Experts at the International Pro-
gress Organization, Geneva, Switzerland) (giving an overview of the number of prison-
ers exchanged through April 1989).
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rights law. This note assesses the positions of Iran and Iraq concerning
their obligation to release and repatriate their prisoners of war.
I. THE OBLIGATION TO RELEASE AND REPATRIATE
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an obligation developed in
customary international law to release prisoners at the end of wars,
rather than to execute or enslave them. The obligation to repatriate
prisoners of war was included in The Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land (Hague, 1907) which provided: "[A]fter
the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall be
carried out as quickly as possible."' 4 The 1949 Geneva Convention Rel-
ative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, usually referred to as the
Third Geneva Convention, made a significant change in the law gov-
erning the repatriation of prisoners; it provided in article 118:
"[P]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay af-
ter the cessation of active hostilities."5 The Third Geneva Convention,
thus, advanced the time at which prisoners must be released and repa-
triated from the conclusion of peace to the cessation of hostilities.' The
change was important because peace treaties are often concluded long
after the cessation of hostilities. In the Middle East, for example, Israel
concluded armistice agreements with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and
Egypt in 1949,1 but to date, only one peace treaty has been concluded
between Israel and Egypt.8 Nonetheless, even in the absence of peace
agreements, prisoners have been exchanged from time to time between
Israel and the Arab states.'
Both Iraq and Iran are parties to the Third Geneva Convention.' °
3. C.S. DELESSERT, RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AT THE
END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES: A STUDY OF ARTICLE 118, PARAGRAPH I OF THE THIRD
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 70
(1977).
4. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 20, 36 Stat. 2277, 2301, T.S. No. 539, at 30.
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3406, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 3454, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, 224 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
6. C.S. DELESSERT, supra note 3.
7. Egypt-Israel, General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 251;
Israel-Lebanon, General Armistice Agreement, Mar. 23, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 287;
Israel-Jordan, General Armistice Agreement, Apr. 3, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 303; Israel-
Syria, General Armistice Agreement, July 20, 1949, 42 U.N.T.S. 327.
8. DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 78, A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 7
(1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1466 (1978).
9. H.E. Wissam Zahawie, supra note 2, at 12.
10. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5. The Convention was ratified by Iraq
on Feb. 14, 1956, 230 U.N.T.S. 433. Iran ratified on Feb. 20, 1957, 264 U.N.T.S. 335.
[VOL. 5:73
REPATRIATION OF POWS
The war began in 1980 and continued until a cease-fire entered into
effect on August 20, 1988.11 The cease-fire left Iraq in occupation of
small areas of Iranian territory.1 2 Since the cease-fire, however, the two
nations have not engaged in armed combat against each other.13 Iraq
says that there is a "cessation of active hostilities" within the meaning
of article 118 because both parties have observed a cease-fire since Au-
gust 20, 1988.11 Iran, however, takes the position that there is no "ces-
sation of active hostilities" because it considers the cease-fire to be un-
stable, due to some violations, and because Iraq holds some Iranian
territory, which raises the possibility that the parties will resume fight-
ing. 15 Article 118 does not clearly define "cessation of active hostili-
ties." It could mean simply that the parties are not currently shooting
at each other. It probably includes within the definition, however, that
hostilities are not expected to resume in the near future.' 6 The ration-
ale for the obligation to release and repatriate prisoners at the cessation
of hostilities is that there is no expectation that the prisoners will be
used against the detaining party.' If hostilities have ceased, but are
likely to resume shortly, that rationale does not exist."8
II. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598
Iran and Iraq agreed to a cease-fire in United Nations Security
Council Resolution 598 of July 20, 1987 (Resolution 598).'1 Resolution
598 calls for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of forces from each other's ter-
ritory, a return of prisoners, and negotiations to settle all outstanding
issues.2 0 Iraq expressed acceptance of Resolution 598 in a letter to the
Secretary-General dated July 23, 1987,21 and Iran proceeded similarly
on July 17, 1988.2 By Resolution 619 of August 9, 1988, the Security
11. UN Conducts Peace Talks in Geneva, New York, 25 U.N. CHRONICLE 20
(Dec. 1988) [hereinafter UN Conducts].
12. Lewis, Gulf Talks Stall Over a Waterway, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9. 1988, at AlI
[hereinafter Lewis, Gulf Talks].
13. H.E. Wissam Zahawie, supra note 2, at 11.
14. Id. at 11-12.
15. Id. at 5-6.
16. C.S. DELESSERT, supra note 3, at 97-105.
17. J. DE PREUX, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 546-47 (J. Pictet ed. 1960).
18. Id.
19. S.C. Res. 598, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (1987).
20. Id.
21. Letter Dated 14 August 1987 Front the Charge d'Affaires A.L of the Perma-
nent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, An-
nex at 2, U.N. Doc. S/19045 (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1485 (1987) [hereinafter
Letter of August 14, 1987].
22. See UN Conducts, supra note 11, at 22 (stating that Iran's acceptance of Reso-
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Council established the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNI-
IMOG) and deployed it along the Iran-Iraq border.23 The cease-fire
went into effect August 20, 1988.24
The agreement between Iran and Iraq to cease fire on the basis of
Resolution 598 constitutes an expression of both nations' belief that
hostilities between them terminated. Both parties undertook to negoti-
ate a peace treaty. Those negotiations, however, have been held for
only short periods and have made little progress. 25 Nonetheless, the
parties have manifested no intention of resuming hostilities. 26 It would
appear, therefore, that a "cessation of active hostilities" within the
meaning of article 118 is present.
Through Resolution 598, however, the United Nations introduced an
element of uncertainty into what would be an otherwise clear obligation
to release and repatriate prisoners without delay. It did, to be sure,
urge "that prisoners-of-war be released and repatriated without delay
after the cessation of active hostilities in accordance with the Third
Geneva Convention," but it put that call in paragraph three of Resolu-
tion 598.27 In paragraph one, it demanded that, "as a first step towards
a negotiated settlement, Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire,
discontinue all military actions on land, at sea, and in the air, and with-
draw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without
delay. "28
Relying on this juxtaposition and on the words "as a first step," Iran
took the position that a release of prisoners should be considered only
as part of a package arrangement that would include Iraq's withdrawal
from Iranian territory, and that the requirements of paragraph one
must be fulfilled before those of paragraph three.29 Iraq disputed Iran's
lution 598 paved the way for the cease-fire).
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id.
25. See generally Lewis, Gulf Talks, supra note 12 (describing the deadlock over
Iraq's effort to improve its rights over Shatt al-Arab waterway, Iraq's only outlet to the
sea); Lewis, U.N. Acts to Spur Iran-Iraq Talks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1989, at A19
(stating that three rounds of talks had provided little progress); Iraq Called Willing to
Soften Stand in Its Talks with Iran, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, at A4 (describing the
United Nations promotion to resume talks).
26. H.E. Wissam Zahawie, supra note 2, at 11.
27. S.C. Res. 598 at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (1987).
28. Id.
29. Letter Dated 14 March 1989 from the Charge d'Affaires A.!. of the Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secre-
tary-General, Annex at 2, U.N. Doc. S/20529 (1989); see also Letter Dated 17 March
1989 from the Charge d'Affaires A.!. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex at 2,
U.N. Doc. S/20532 (1989) (reiterating that Iran considers withdrawal to internation-
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construction of Resolution 598 and said that it did not subordinate the
release and repatriation of prisoners to the prior resolution of other is-
sues.30 It said that the fact that the prisoner issue was treated in para-
graph three did not make that issue "dependent upon the degree of
progress accomplished at the talks. ' 31 Iraq further stated that the obli-
gation to release and repatriate prisoners is not contingent on other is-
sues, in particular, on its withdrawal from Iranian territory, which it
says can be effectuated only as part of an agreement between the two
states for more comprehensive United Nations policing arrangements
to ensure that the cease-fire will continue.32
Iraq indicated to the International Committee of the Red Cross
(I.C.R.C.) on October 4, 1988, that it was willing to begin "the process
of a comprehensive exchange of prisoners." 33 President Saddam Hus-
sein of Iraq reiterated to the United Nations on March 5, 1989, that
Iraq is ready to release and repatriate prisoners immediately on a mu-
tual basis. 4 Iraq charged that Iran's linking of the prisoner issue with
the other issues converted "tens of thousands of Iraqi and Iranian pris-
oners into the pawns of political intrigues." 35
The fact that Iran holds more prisoners than Iraq may be a factor in
Iran's reluctance to treat the prisoner issue separately. The I.C.R.C.
estimates that Iran holds about 70,000 prisoners, while Iraq holds
about 35,000.6 The numbers, however, are disputed. The International
Committee of the Red Cross was unable to convince the parties to no-
tify it of the names of prisoners upon capture and, thus, does not have
reliable figures. The I.C.R.C. has undertaken to register prisoners itself
ally recognized borders a prerequisite to the release of POWs).
30. Letter of August 14, 1987, supra note 21.
31. Letter Dated 18 April 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex at 4, U.N. Doe. S/20597
(1989) [hereinafter Letter of April 18, 1989].
32. See id. (stating that the parties should repatriate POWs without awaiting reso-
lution of political issues); H.E. Wissam Zahawie, supra note 2, at II (stating that
delays in repatriation turn the POWs into political bargaining chips).
33. Letter Dated 22 February 1989fron the Permanent Representative of Iraq to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. Annex at 3, U.N. Doe. S/
20478 (1989) [hereinafter Letter of February 22, 1989].
34. Letter Dated 6 March 1989from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex at 2, U.N. Doe. S/20506
(1989) [hereinafter Letter of March 6. 1989].
35. Letter of April 18. 1989, supra note 31; see also Lewis, Red Cross Seeks,
supra note I (reporting that Iraq is ready for mutual release of prisoners, but that Iran
is demanding that Iraq first withdraw forces from Iranian territory).
36. Lewis, Red Cross Seeks, supra note 1. The I.C.R.C., however, has registered
only 50,182 Iraqi prisoners in Iran and 19,284 Iranian prisoners in Iraq. Iraq Accepts a
Swap Of Wounded P.O.W.'s, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1988, at A8 [hereinafter Iraq
Accepts].
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during visits to POW camps in the two countries, but has not gained
access to all prisoners. 7
Iran considers that both sides hold an approximately equal number
of prisoners because it includes Iranian civilians who allegedly went
into Iraq during the war and are living in camps there.38 Iran estimates
the number of such persons at 60,000."' In August 1988, Iraq acknowl-
edged to a United Nations visiting mission the presence in Iraq of
55,000 Iranian civilians, most of Iranian-Kurdish or Iranian-Arab de-
scent. Iraq, however, contended that these Iranians went to Iraq volun-
tarily and were free to leave.40 Iraq assigned them to residence camps,
although some took employment outside these camps. The United Na-
tions mission concluded that some Iranians had gone to Iraq voluntarily
during the war, but that the majority of them had done so for political
reasons in 1979, just prior to the war's commencement.4' The mission
found, however, that Iraq had forcibly deported some of these civilians
from areas of northwest Iran."2 Furthermore, the mission reported from
conversations with Iranian-Kurdish civilians that although some desired
to go to third countries, most wanted to return to Iran if they could be
given guarantees against persecution.'3
III. THE UNILATERAL NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION
During the hostilities, Iran and Iraq released approximately equal
numbers of wounded, sick, and elderly prisoners.4 In so doing, they
37. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, MEMORANDUM ON THE IM-
PLEMENTATION BY IRAQ OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR DURING THE PERIOD FROM 1985 TO JUNE 1988 4
(July 15, 1988). Iraq's position is that it withheld names of some prisoners in order to
pressure Iran to disclose the names of Iraqi prisoners it held. Id. In November 1988,
Iraq agreed to give the I.C.R.C. the names of all Iranian prisoners it held. Id.; see also
Letter of February 22, 1989, supra note 33 (stating that Iran had rejected an I.C.R.C.
initiative to register POWs).
38. Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General on the Situation
of Prisoners of War in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, Annex at 27-30, U.N.






44. See generally ICRC Press Release No. 1495, Oct. 20, 1984 (announcing Iraq's
release of 100 Iranian prisoners and civilian internees); ICRC Press Release No. 1496,
Oct. 25, 1984 (reporting Iran's release of 72 wounded and sick Iraqi prisoners); ICRC
Press Release No. 1535, Mar. 17, 1986 (informing of Iran's release of 76 disabled,
sick, and elderly Iraqi prisoners); ICRC Press Release No. 1549, Oct. 2, 1987 (disclos-
ing Iran's release of 101 disabled, sick, and elderly Iraqi prisoners); ICRC Press Re-
lease No. 1562, Feb. 17, 1988 (communicating Iran's release of 28 disabled, sick, and
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complied, at least in part, with the obligation imposed by article 109 of
the Third Geneva Convention to repatriate wounded and sick prisoners
without waiting for the cessation of hostilities. After the August 20,
1988, cease-fire, the parties continued to repatriate small numbers of
wounded and sick prisoners. 5 Finally, in November 1988, both nations
agreed to repatriate all wounded and sick prisoners registered by the
I.C.R.C. by December 31, 1988. This number of prisoners amounted to
411 Iranian prisoners held in Iraq, and 1, 115 Iraqi prisoners held in
Iran."
Both Iran and Iraq suspended the repatriation of prisoners. Both
states halted the exchange of prisoners blaming each other for not re-
leasing the correct number of prisoners set forth in the agreement.'
Iran claimed that it had released fewer prisoners than agreed because
some refused repatriation." The I.C.R.C. had not been granted access
to these prisoners, so it could not verify their wishes .4 Even after the
agreement failed, however, both sides continued unilateral releases of
small numbers of sick and wounded prisoners from time to time."
Although Iraq is willing to negotiate a mutual release and repatria-
tion, it is not willing to release and repatriate its Iranian prisoners uni-
elderly Iraqi prisoners); Iraq Accepts, supra note 36 (stating that each side has re-
leased 700 sick and wounded since the beginning of the war).
45. See generally ICRC Press Release No. 1585, Sept. 12, 1988 (reporting Iran's
release of 72 disabled, sick, and elderly Iraqi prisoners); ICRC Press Release No. 1588,
Oct. 31, 1988 (announcing Iran's and Iraq's release of 50 disabled, sick, and elderly
prisoners each).
46. See Iraq Accepts, supra note 36 (reporting Iraq's acceptance of Iran's proposal
to exchange the sick and wounded prisoners the I.C.R.C. has registered); ICRC Press
Release No. 1590, Nov. 11, 1988 (outlining details of the agreement to repatriate
POWs).
47. Letter Dated 29 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,
Annex at 2, U.N. Doc. S/20304 (1988) [hereinafter Letter of November 29. 1988]; see
also Letter Dated 15 December 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,
Annex at 2, U.N. Doc. S/20335 (1988) (reiterating concern for Iraq's failure to repa-
triate all the prisoners the agreement contemplated); H.E. Wissam Zahawie, supra
note 2, at 7-8 (discussing Iraq's reasons for releasing fewer prisoners than agreed).
48. H.E. Wissam Zahawie, supra note 2, at 7-8; see also Letter of November 29,
1988, supra note 47 (stating that some Iraqi POWs sought asylum in Iran when of-
fered repatriation).
49. Teheran Suspends P.O.W. Trade With Baghdad, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1988,
at A14.
50. See ICRC Press Release No. 1600, Jan. 24, 1989 (disclosing Iraq's release of
255 wounded, sick, or elderly Iranian prisoners); ICRC Press Release No. 1602, Feb.
23, 1989 (announcing Iran's release of 233 wounded, sick, or elderly Iraqi prisoners);
ICRC Press Release No. 1604, Apr. 10, 1989 (reporting Iran's release of 66 wounded,
sick, or elderly Iraqi prisoners).
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laterally. 51 State practice prior to the Third Geneva Convention had
been for release and repatriation as a quid pro quo for release and
repatriation by the other party.52 Article 118 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention, however, required prisoner release and repatriation upon the
cessation of hostilities,5" rather than upon the conclusion of a peace
treaty. In so doing, article 118 made clear a postulate not identified in
the Hague Convention, namely, the obligation to release and repatriate
is not dependent on a corresponding release and repatriation by the
other party. 54
Article 118 requires a party to release its prisoners, even though the
other party shows no willingness to reciprocate. This rule may seem
harsh. A party in Iraq's situation may well consider that it is more
likely to gain the release of its nationals held by the other party and,
thereby, achieve a goal of article 118, if it retains the prisoners it has
taken to pressure the other party to negotiate a mutual release. In such
a situation, Iraq could claim that Iran is in material breach of its arti-
cle 118 obligation, though given the unilateral character of the obliga-
tion, Iraq is also breaching. It is not open to Iraq to refuse performance
on the basis of a material breach by Iran because material breach is
not a ground for nonperformance of an obligation of a humanitarian
character.
55
The unilateral character of the obligation is more clear if one deems
human rights law relevant to the situation of a prisoner. States have
increasingly found human rights law applicable, in addition to humani-
tarian law, in various aspects of belligerency.56 Under human rights
law, every person has a right not to be arbitrarily detained, 57 and once
hostilities have ended, arguably, no lawful justification for detention
exists.
51. See Letter of February 22, 1989, supra note 33 (stating that Iraq is willing to
participate in exchanges of prisoners); Letter of March 6. 1989, supra note 34 (reiter-
ating Iraq's willingness to exchange all POWs).
52. C.S. DELESSERT, supra note 3, at 70.
53. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5.
54. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the
two treaties).
55. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 60, para. 5,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), and
in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
56. See, e.g., Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law and the Law of
Belligerent Occupation: Does an Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom of
Assembly and Expression? 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2-13 (1989) (discussing
the universality of human rights law during wartime).




IV. THE WISHES OF THE PRISONER
One issue that potentially obstructs a repatriation of the prisoners
held by Iran and Iraq is that some prisoners may not desire repatria-
tion.58 Both Iran and Iraq have apparently urged the prisoners they
hold that the other side was at fault and that justice was on their side.
Iran has reportedly put psychological pressure on its Iraqi prisoners to
change their views. 9
The I.C.R.C. has expressed concern over the Iranian authorities' in-
doctrination of Iraqi prisoners. In a 1983 memorandum to all signato-
ries of the Third Geneva Convention, the I.C.R.C. stated that Iraqi
prisoners had been "subjected to ideological and political pressure, con-
trary to the Convention." 6 It stated further, that Iran had subjected its
Iraqi prisoners to "forced participation in demonstrations decrying the
Iraqi Government."'" In another memorandum to the signatories in
1984, the I.C.R.C. said that it had complained to the government of
Iran of "intimidation" used against Iraqi prisoners in a "re-education"
process, "with the aim of turning the prisoners against their own
government."6
In Iran, according to a 1988 United Nations report, Iraqi prisoners
were in some instances segregated, depending on whether Iran consid-
ered them Iraqi loyalists or believers in Iran's approach to Islam.6 3 Ira-
nian authorities have provided what they term "spiritual guidance" to
Iraqi prisoners." United Nations investigators who visited POW camps
in both Iran and Iraq at the time of the cease-fire in 1988 reported that
at each POW camp they visited in Iran, about half the prisoners con-
ducted "fanatical, hysterical and sometimes violent demonstrations,"
during which they chanted slogans against President Saddam Hussein
of Iraq, against the United States and the U.S.S.R., and in favor of the
58. See ICRC Press Release No. 1602, Feb. 23, 1989 (stating that of 233
wounded, sick, or elderly prisoners Iran released between February 21, 1989, and Feb-
ruary 23, 1989, 27 refused repatriation and remained in Iran); ICRC Press Release
No. 1604, Apr. 10, 1989 (reporting that of 70 wounded, sick, or elderly prisoners Iran
released on April 10, 1989, four refused repatriation and remained in Iran). Some Iraqi
prisoners in POW camps in Iran expressed to the United Nations investigators a con-
cern about Iraqi government reprisals against their relatives, should they refuse repatri-
ation. Report of the Mission, supra note 38, at 14. But see ICRC Press Release No.
1600, Jan. 24, 1989 (commenting that of the 255 wounded, sick, or elderly prisoners
Iraq released on January 23, and 24, 1989, none refused repatriation).
59. Report of the Mission, supra note 38, at 13-14.
60. ICRC Press Release No. 1462, May I1, 1983, at 2.
61. Id.
62. ICRC Press Release No. 1480, Feb. 15, 1984, at 2.
63. Report of the Mission, supra note 38, at 11.
64. Id. at 12.
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Ayatollah Khomeini."5 I.C.R.C. visitors reported similar demonstra-
tions. 6 The United Nations investigators said that some Iraqi prisoners
considered the "spiritual guidance" to be brainwashing and that it put
them under great mental pressure.67
Iranian prisoners in POW camps in Iraq also do not appear to be
uniform in their loyalties. The United Nations investigators reported
that some were loyal to the government of Iran, others to the previous
government of Iran, and the rest to the Mojahedin-e Khalq,68 an Ira-
nian dissident movement that transferred its base of operations to Iraq
and some of whose members enlisted in Iraq's army to fight against
Iran. Many Iranian prisoners in POW camps in Iraq complained to the
investigators that spies among the prisoners reported to camp com-
manders on the prisoners' political views.69 Although most prisoners ex-
pressed a desire to return to Iran, some asked the investigators whether
they would be forced to return to Iran against their will.70 The prison-
ers were concerned that the government of Iran might take reprisals
against them after their return because not all of them remained loyal
to Iran.71 Consequently, they asked whether there would be any guar-
antees to protect them against such reprisals. 2
Article 118 does not condition a belligerent's obligation to release
and repatriate a prisoner on the willingness of the prisoner to be re-
leased and repatriated.73 This matter was raised at the Geneva Confer-
ence discussion leading to the Third Geneva Convention, but delegates
expressed the fear that the detaining state might manipulate the pris-
oners to keep them from expressing a true desire to be repatriated.74
Article 118 does not specifically address the wishes of the prisoner.",
By contrast, article 109, which requires release and repatriation of seri-
ously sick and wounded prisoners even during hostilities, expressly
states: "[N]o sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatri-
ation .. .may be repatriated against his will during hostilities."7 6
65. Id. at 13.
66. Lewis, Red Cross Seeks, supra note 1.
67. Report of the Mission, supra note 38, at 11.





73. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 118 (making no mention of
the wishes of the prisoners).
74. J. DE PREUX, supra note 17, at 542; see also C.S. DELESSERT, supra note 3, at
68-69 (discussing the debate during the Conference).
75. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 118.
76. Id. art. 109; see also J. DE PREUX, supra note 17, at 542-43 (discussing article
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State practice since 1949 has shown that the wishes of the prisoner
are considered.77 In the Iran-Iraq War, in particular, the I.C.R.C.,
which has facilitated the releases to date, has questioned prisoners with
no witnesses present to determine their wishes.78 As indicated, those
rejecting repatriation have been permitted to remain in the territory of
the detaining state.79
A strong argument may be made on the basis of human rights law
that a prisoner's desire should be considered. Under human rights law,
a person enjoys a right to emigrate 0 and a right to seek asylum.8
Forced repatriation would violate these rights. While it could be as-
serted that the person must first return and then exercise the right to
emigrate or to seek asylum, forced repatriation would seem to violate
both rights.
The Third Geneva Convention is silent on the question of guarantees
that a returning prisoner will not be treated harshly if his government
is concerned over disloyalty he may have manifested during captivity.
This matter requires attention in the Iran-Iraq context. The parties
should give clear guarantees that they will not victimize either those
prisoners who return, or the families of those prisoners who choose to
remain. Guarantees will be difficult to effectuate because such victimi-
zation can be subtle and can occur well into the future.
109 of the Convention).
77. See G.A. Res. 610, art. 2, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/
2361 (1953) (prohibiting use of force against PO\Vs to block or compel their return to
their native land); see also J. DE PREUX, supra note 17, at 544-45 (discussing the
United Nations' refusal to adopt North Korea's suggestion that POWs be repatriated
without regard to their wishes).
78. See ICRC Press Release No. 1496, Oct. 25, 1984 (stating that the I.C.R.C.
privately interviewed Iraqi prisoners prior to repatriation); ICRC Press Release No.
1535, Mar. 17, 1986 (announcing the repatriation of Iraqi POWs after private inter-
views were conducted to determine their wishes). But see Lewis, Red Cross Seeks,
supra note I (noting I.C.R.C. complaints that it was not granted access to all prisoners
to determine their wishes).
79. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (describing the refusal of some
Iraqi POWs to return to Iraq).
80. See generally H. HANNUmI, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETrURN IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1987) (explaining a person's right to leave his or her
country).
81. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (implementing measures designed to foster international cooperation in
the granting of asylum to refugees); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (extending
the protection afforded under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to
individuals who achieved refugee status after January 1, 1951).
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V. THE OBLIGATIONS OF OTHER STATES PARTIES TO
THE CONVENTION
The likelihood that Iran and Iraq will soon release and repatriate all
of their prisoners is not great because Iran links the prisoner issue to
other issues that are not likely to be resolved soon and Iraq is not will-
ing to release prisoners unilaterally.82 This unfortunate situation makes
the obligation in article 1 of the Third Geneva Convention important.83
Article 1 states that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to re-
spect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circum-
stances. 18 4 Although the scope of that obligation is not clear, other
party states, including most of the world community,85 are required to
encourage Iran and Iraq to release and repatriate their prisoners.
The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) makes the obligation to release and repatriate
prisoners more precise.86 Article 89 of Protocol I states that in "situa-
tions of serious violations of the Conventions . . . the High Contracting
Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually."8 Furthermore, article
85(4) of Protocol I defines "unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of
prisoners of war" as a "grave breach," thereby making it clear that
failure to repatriate is a "serious violation" within the meaning of arti-
cle 89.88 To be sure, Protocol I is not universally ratified.89 Neverthe-
less, it shows that many of the states parties recognize a mutual obliga-
tion to ensure respect for the Convention. The I.C.R.C., as indicated,
sends information about its work on the issue to the states parties to
the Convention to encourage them to take an interest in the matter."
82. See H.E. Wissam Zahawie, supra note 2, at 6, 9 (explaining how Iran's de-
mand for Iraq's withdrawal from Iranian territory prior to repatriation of POWs vio-
lates Resolution 598 and the Third Geneva Convention).
83. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
84. Id.
85. TREATIES IN FORCE 360 (Jan. 1, 1989). As of January 1, 1989, 167 states were
parties to the Third Geneva Convention. The only states not parties were Bhutan,
Maldives, Nauru, and Burma. Id.
86. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
December 12, 1977, U.N. Doe. A/32/144, Annex I and 11 (1977), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
87. Id. art. 89.
88. Id. art. 85(4).
89. 269 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 163 (Mar./Apr. 1989). As of February 8, 1989,
eighty countries had ratified the Protocol. Id.
90. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing the I.C.R.C.'s appeal




United Nations Security Resolution 598 encouraged Iran and Iraq to
release and repatriate their prisoners, but since the 1988 cease-fire
went into effect, other states have not given significant attention to the
situation of the Iranian and Iraqi prisoners. A unified position by the
industrialized countries might well influence the parties, as might a
concerted effort by the other powerful Islamic states.
One possible way for states parties to pressure Iran and Iraq would
be to seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,1 on
the question of the unilateral nature of the obligation to release and
repatriate, on the question of how to accommodate the wishes of the
prisoner with respect to repatriation, and on the question of guarantees
to prevent reprisals against returning prisoners or against the families
of prisoners who refuse repatriation. The court might also be asked to
clarify the relevance of human rights law to the issue of release and
repatriation. Member states of the United Nations could ask either the
Security Council or the General Assembly to request an advisory opin-
ion. 92 An advisory opinion would presumably stress the obligation of
both parties to release and repatriate their prisoners.
Political pressure must also be exerted more forcefully through the
United Nations to encourage Iran and Iraq on the prisoner issue. The
United Nations, however, is a creature of its member states. The ac-
tions of the United Nations will be limited if the member states do not
treat the prisoner issue with all due seriousness. At present, unfortu-
nately, the member states are not making this issue a matter of
priority.
Since its adoption of Resolution 598 in 1987, the Security Council
has not devoted much of its attention to Iran and Iraq. Although the
Security Council played an important role in bringing the hostilities to
an end, it should not view its job as complete. The Security Council
might play a vital role in exerting pressure on Iraq and Iran to release
their prisoners.
CONCLUSION
Negotiations between Iran and Iraq for a general settlement are at a
standstill, and no separate negotiations on the prisoner issue are con-
templated. Neither party is inclined to release and repatriate prisoners
unilaterally. The prospect thus exists that more than 100,000 prisoners
91. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (stipulating that the International Court of Justice
is the primary judicial body of the United Nations).
92. Id. art. 96, para. 1.
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could remain in POW camps for an extended period.9 3 If the humani-
tarian goal of the Third Geneva Convention is to be attained, all states
parties should take their article 1 obligation seriously to ensure respect
for the Convention by other states parties.
93. See Brooks, Stalemated Iran-Iraq Peace Negotiations Leave Thousands of
POWs Languishing, Wall St. J., June 23, 1989, at AI0 (explaining that repatriation of
prisoners has halted because Iran hopes to use Iraqi POWs as leverage for the reacqui-
sition of border territory lost to Iraq during the war).
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